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March 30, 2007

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Acronyms

ATSD(NCB)	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
CAG	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Action Group
CPRC	Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
USSTRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



INSPECTOR GENERAL
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March 30, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Report on DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Report No. D-2007-067)


We are providing this report for review and comment. The Director, Administration and Management did not respond to the draft report. We considered comments from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the U.S. Strategic Command in preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Responding on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the comments from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) were partially responsive. As a result of those comments, we deleted Recommendations 2.c.(1) and 2.c.(2), renumbered Recommendation 2.c.(3) as 2.d., and added Recommendation 2.c. We also added a new Recommendation 3, and renumbered Recommendations 3. and 4. as Recommendations 4. and 5., respectively. We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provide additional comments on Recommendation 2.c. We also request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Director, Joint Staff comment on Recommendation 3., and that the Director, Administration and Management comment on Recommendation 4. Management should provide comments by April 30, 2007.

If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to AudROS@dodig.mil. Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Dennis L. Conway at (703) 604-9172 (DSN 664-9172) or Mr. Donney J. Bibb at (703) 604-9613 (DSN 664-9613). The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:


for Wanda A. Scott
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Operations Support

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2007-067

March 30, 2007

(Project No. D2005-D000LG-0050.000)

DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? Civil service employees and uniformed officers responsible for combating weapons of mass destruction should read this report. This report discusses DoD implementation of its programs for combating weapons of mass destruction.

Results. Although DoD improved its organization, roles, and responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction, improved management oversight would have increased the effectiveness of those limited resources. Specifically, DoD needs to:

- coordinate the work of the 40 offices involved with combating weapons of mass destruction,
- clearly identify the use of more than \$917 million budgeted in FY 2004 for 31 programs,
- consistently report on whether it accomplished the goals for combating weapons of mass destruction programs or explain why not, and
- propose legislation that provides for coordination with each Federal agency involved in combating weapons of mass destruction.


Without improved management, DoD cannot be assured that planned expenditures of at least \$9.9 billion for FYs 2006 through 2011 is effectively spent, that U.S. interests are adequately protected, and that DoD can properly respond to an attack. DoD officials must improve planning to protect the United States and combat weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should designate a single office to oversee organizations responsible for combating weapons of mass destruction and update the appropriate directives.

In addition, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary for Policy; and the Director, Joint Staff should develop an annual performance plan and annual performance report that consolidates all DoD initiatives for combating weapons of mass destruction. Also, the Director of Administration and Management and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command should include combating weapons of mass destruction as part of their self-evaluation in their managers' internal control program. The Commander also needs to complete the concept of operations plan. See the Finding section for the detailed recommendations.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the

U.S. Strategic Command commented on the draft report. The Director, Administration and Management did not provide comments. See the Finding section of the report for a discussion of management comments and the Management Comments section for the complete text of the comments.

(FOUO)



The U.S. Strategic Command stated that it will complete the concept of operations plan in the fall of 2006 and will perform a self-evaluation of its efforts for combating weapons of mass destruction.

We revised the report to recognize management actions taken. These actions will improve DoD efforts to manage funds used to combat weapons of mass destruction, to protect U.S. interests, and to properly respond to an attack when others use weapons of mass destruction.

(FOUO)



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Per OSD

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Background

Congress enacted Public Law 104-201, title XIV, "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996," to improve planning and countermeasures for weapons of mass destruction. Further, in the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," December 2002, the President states that the U.S. Government must place the highest priority on protecting the United States and its allies from the existing and growing threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review included preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD as a priority area. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, 40 offices have some level of responsibility for combating WMD according to information provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]).

For FY 2006 through FY 2011, DoD budgeted at least \$9.9 billion to combat WMD. In the Chemical and Biological Defense Program's Annual Report to Congress, March 2005, DoD reported \$9.1 billion for chemical and biological defense programs. In addition, budget officials in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD[NCB])¹ identified an additional \$0.8 billion of military construction funds for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases.

Public Law 104-201. Section 1402 of Public Law 104-201 states that the potential WMD threat to U.S. citizens must be taken seriously. The law specifically states that the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups for acquiring WMD is greater than at any other time in history. According to Congress, that capability exists because:

- raw material for WMD is available from legitimate commercial sources;
- technological information related to WMD is readily available on the Internet; and
- the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 (along with disruptions in its command and control systems, deficiencies in weapons accountability, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control) substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire WMD and related materials and technologies.

Congress found that the United States lacked adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of terrorism through WMD. In addition to highlighting threats and capabilities, Public Law 104-201 states that traditional arms control methods aimed at large WMD initiatives are ineffective in monitoring and controlling smaller, but potentially more dangerous, WMD proliferation initiatives. To address that concern, the public law states that the

¹ ATSD[NCB] is a component of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Federal Government as well as state and local governments should develop and allocate responsibilities for effective WMD countermeasures.

National Strategy. The “National Strategy to Combat WMD” states that the United States faces one of the greatest security challenges from hostile states and terrorists that possess WMD. To counter the security challenges, WMD prevention is categorized into three areas referred to as pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.

- Nonproliferation tries to prevent proliferation of WMD technologies, materials, and expertise through diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls.
- Counterproliferation tries to stop the threat or use of WMD through:
 - interdiction before WMD reaches hostile states or terrorists,
 - deterrence through strong declaratory policies and effective military forces, and
 - mitigation through capabilities that detect and destroy WMD and through a robust active and passive defense.
- Consequence management tries to restore essential services and respond to the consequences as well as the effects of WMD.

Counterproliferation Responsibilities. DoD Directive 2060.2, “Department of Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation,” July 9, 1996,² assigns WMD counterproliferation responsibilities to USD(P), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (now the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The directive states that:

- USD(P) develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of the counterproliferation policy;
- USD(AT&L) coordinates DoD research, development, and acquisition programs that will support counterproliferation initiatives; and
- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares plans that address proliferation threats, reviews combatant commanders’ prepared plans, and develops doctrine for joint counterproliferation.

Additional DoD Components with missions for combating WMD—such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Joint Staff, and other offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense—are discussed in Appendix B. Appendix B also identifies the 40 offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff that

² USD(P) drafted a revision, which will be renamed “Department of Defense (DoD) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy.”

USD(P) officials identified as having some level of responsibility for combating WMD.

Objectives

The overall audit objective was to assess DoD organizational arrangements for countering proliferation of WMD. Specifically, we reviewed the roles and responsibilities of USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and USSTRATCOM in combating WMD proliferation and evaluated the economy and the efficiency of those efforts. We also reviewed the management control program as it related to the overall objective. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objectives.

Managers' Internal Control Program

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996, and DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Management Control (MC) Program Procedures," August 28, 1996, require that DoD Components implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and that evaluates the adequacy of the controls. (The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) reissued DoD Instruction 5010.40 on January 4, 2006. The instruction was retitled "Managers' Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures." The revised instruction requires that DoD Components annually report reasonable assurance to the Secretary of Defense about the effectiveness of their internal controls. DoD Directive 5010.38 was cancelled on April 3, 2006.)

Scope of the Review of the Managers' Internal Control Program. We limited our review of the management control program to DoD organizations combating WMD. Specifically, we:

- interviewed management control officials in organizations responsible for combating WMD to determine the extent of DoD participation in the management control program and to assess their support of internal control objectives,
- determined whether combating WMD was included in a self-evaluation process, and
- assessed the adequacy of management's self-evaluation.

Adequacy of Management Controls. The Director of Administration and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the senior management control official for Office of the Secretary of Defense activities. The Comptroller is the senior management control official at USSTRATCOM. Senior management control officials are responsible for establishing and implementing the requirements of DoD Directive 5010.38.

The Director of Administration and Management provided the annual statements of assurance that USD(P) and USD(AT&L) completed for their management control programs in July 2005. However, USD(P) and USD(AT&L) officials did not identify combating WMD as an assessable unit, and therefore did not identify or report the management control weaknesses identified in this audit.

The Secretary of Defense assigned responsibilities for combating WMD to USSTRATCOM in January 2005. However, when USSTRATCOM officials completed the annual statement of assurance in July 2005, they also did not identify combating WMD as an assessable unit, and therefore did not identify or report the management control weaknesses discussed in this audit.

Although they did not identify combating WMD as an assessable unit in the management control programs, DoD Components took action to improve the DoD organizational structure relating to WMD.

Adequacy of Management's Self-Evaluation. The Office of the Director for Administration and Management and USSTRATCOM did not perform a self-evaluation of management controls in combating WMD as DoD Directive 5010.38 requires. Consequently, those DoD Components did not identify combating WMD as an assessable unit; therefore, they did not identify or report the management control weaknesses identified in this report.

Management Comments. Responding for the Under Secretary of Defense, the Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that he did not agree that a material management control weakness existed.

Audit Response to Management Comments. Since DoD Instruction 5010.40 states that a material management control weakness must be a condition requiring the attention of the next higher level of management, and that decision is up to management at the level discovering the weakness, we removed the word "material."

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Although DoD improved its WMD organizational structure, including the roles and responsibilities for combating WMD, improved management efforts would have increased the effective use of limited resources. Specifically, DoD needed to:

- coordinate the work of the 40 offices involved with combating WMD,
- establish a process to measure performance that consistently reports on the goals accomplished for planned WMD programs and provide explanations when goals are not met,
- clearly identify the use of more than \$917 million budgeted in FY 2004 for 31 programs, and
- propose legislation that requires each Federal agency involved in combating weapons of mass destruction to coordinate with one another.

Because it did not effectively establish responsibilities for its WMD program, DoD cannot be assured that planned expenditures totaling at least \$9.9 billion from FY 2006 through FY 2011 will be effectively spent. In addition, DoD cannot be assured that U.S. interests are adequately protected or that DoD can properly respond to a WMD attack on U.S. interests.

Coordinating WMD Initiatives and Measuring Performance

DoD did not establish a lead office to adequately coordinate its WMD initiatives or develop a performance management process for combating WMD. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, 40 offices had some responsibilities for combating WMD according to information provided by USD(P). However, DoD did not have a process in place that coordinated individual office WMD initiatives or that consolidated DoD goals and accomplishments.

Coordinating Initiatives. DoD oversaw several initiatives for combating WMD, but did not adequately coordinate those actions among its 40 offices. Coordination activities included facilitating negotiations with international agreements and treaties; assisting countries of the former Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD; stopping shipment of WMD; performing research and development on and purchasing technology related to combating WMD; and training U.S. troops. However, DoD managed each of these initiatives separately and did not coordinate the initiatives within the responsible offices even though all are interrelated. As a result, senior DoD officials did not

receive the necessary information to understand the status of DoD actions for combating WMD.

DoD also did not have an organizational structure for integrating initiatives for combating WMD. Instead of coordinating through a single office, DoD coordinated information related to combating WMD through a Federal interagency committee called the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) and a DoD group called Combating WMD Action Group (CAG). Although the CPRC and CAG provided some coordination among key DoD Components as well as other Federal agencies, neither group had decision-making authority.

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. CPRC, which Congress established under section 2751 (note), title 22, United States Code (22 U.S.C. 2751 [note]), coordinates Federal interagency programs related to counterproliferation. However, the CPRC did not coordinate all Government activities for combating WMD; it focused on the accomplishments of member agencies—DoD, the Department of Energy, and the Intelligence community. For example, CPRC oversaw DoD verification of compliance with international WMD treaties. That verification included the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).

However, the CPRC mission was limited and did not include coordinating other DoD responsibilities related to combating WMD. DoD responsibilities included assisting the Department of State during negotiations of international agreements and treaties, assisting countries of the former Soviet Union in securing and dismantling their WMD, stopping shipment of WMD, and training U.S. troops.

ATSD(NCB) officials stated that, although the requirements in 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) were pertinent when Congress enacted the law in 1994, they needed updating. The same officials also stated that 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) focuses on research and development requirements related to counterproliferation, and it does not recognize a need for other requirements, such as those related to combating WMD.

Additionally, ATSD(NCB) officials stated that 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) does not recognize that the structure of the Federal Government has changed since Congress established CPRC and that other Federal agencies have responsibilities related to combating WMD. The officials also stated that the Department of Homeland Security, which coordinates Federal operations associated with preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies did not exist when Congress enacted the law. According to ATSD(NCB) officials, the Department of Health and Human Services, which has medical expertise, and the Environmental Protection Agency, which has industrial chemical expertise, were not members of the CPRC. Participation of those agencies in combating WMD could improve the ability of the Federal Government to plan for the effects of a WMD incident.

Management Action Proposed to Improve Interagency Involvement. To improve interagency involvement, ATSD(NCB) officials stated that they are drafting legislation along with the FY 2008 budget for DoD to eliminate the CPRC. In addition, the ATSD(NCB) stated that he will work with representatives from the National Security Council to create a potentially broader interagency review of combating WMD research and development to meet U.S. needs.

Combating WMD Action Group. The CAG is a DoD working group whose charter was drafted in November 2004. As of September 2005, however, DoD had not approved the charter. As a result, the CAG, which has participants from the offices of USD(P), and USD(AT&L), combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff, was not an official DoD organization. Also, the draft charter did not authorize the CAG to make decisions.

Management Action Taken to Improve DoD Coordination. In January 2006, DoD signed a charter for the Combating WMD Coordination Group,³ whose mission is to promote understanding and improve cooperation among all DoD Components that are combating WMD.

Measuring Combating WMD Performance. DoD did not have a process for measuring performance related to combating WMD activities as the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires. Specifically, DoD did not develop an overall strategic plan, annual performance plan, or annual performance report that would effectively implement the "National Strategy for Combating WMD." As a result, DoD officials could not monitor the progress in combating WMD.

Public Law 103-62, "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993." Congress enacted GPRA to hold Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results and improving program effectiveness. Specifically, GPRA requires that DoD submit a strategic plan, an annual performance plan, and an annual performance report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and Congress. The strategic plan for an agency should identify program goals and objectives, describe how the agency will achieve those goals and objectives, identify external factors that could affect achieving those goals and objectives, and should cover at least 5 years. An agency performance plan should contain performance goals that are quantifiable and provide a basis for comparing results against the performance goals. The performance report should present an agency's success in achieving performance goals, consist of performance indicators obtained from the performance plan, and compare actual performance against prior year goals. The performance report should also explain any goals not met.

DoD Strategic Plan for Combating WMD. The overall strategic plan for DoD is the Quadrennial Defense Review. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on which DoD would base performance reports through 2006 does not adequately address combating WMD or include all of the GPRA requirements for strategic plans.

³ According to the USSTRATCOM comments on the draft report, DoD renamed the CAG as the Combating WMD Coordination Group.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review discusses the importance of defending the homeland against WMD threats, but does not adequately address how to combat WMD. The strategic framework of the Quadrennial Defense Review addresses risks associated with operations, future challenges, force management, and institutional challenges. The report does not include performance goals, performance outcomes, or performance measures that can assess the risk and effectiveness of DoD for combating WMD as GPRA requires.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review also does not have a mission statement and does not describe external factors that could affect the ability of DoD to meet goals related to combating WMD. Therefore, DoD officials could not use it to assess long-term progress toward combating WMD initiatives.

Management Actions to Improve Strategic Planning. DoD Components have been taking steps toward developing strategic plans. DoD issued the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review on February 6, 2006, with a priority area for preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Also, DoD issued the “National Military Strategy to Combat WMD” on February 13, 2006. As the military lead for combating WMD, USSTRATCOM drafted a concept of operations plan, which is an abbreviated operation plan, for combating WMD.

National Military Strategy to Combat WMD. The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD provides guidance and a strategic framework for all DoD Components to ensure that the United States and its allies are neither coerced nor attacked by WMD. The strategy includes nine standards by which DoD can measure effectiveness, four military strategic objectives, and the ability to execute military strategy to enhance their integration, intelligence, partnership capacity, and strategic communication.

The nine standards are:

- deterring WMD use;
- preparing to defeat an adversary threatening to use WMD and to deter follow-on use;
- securing existing worldwide WMD;
- dissuading adversaries from producing WMD;
- detecting and characterizing adversaries’ WMD and seeking to eliminate it;
- dissuading, preventing, defeating, or reversing the proliferation of WMD and related materials;
- minimizing the effects of WMD used against the United States or its interests; continuing operations after a WMD attack; and assisting civil authorities, allies, and partners;
- attributing the source of WMD attack, responding decisively, or deterring future attacks, or both; and

-
- evaluating allies and U.S. civilian agencies to determine their capabilities for combating WMD.

DoD has four military strategic objectives in combating WMD. One objective is defeating and deterring adversaries' capability and willingness to use WMD. Another objective is protecting, responding, and recovering from WMD use on the battlefield or against strategic U.S. interests. The third objective is defending, dissuading, and denying adversaries from WMD proliferation or possession, while increasing ally and partner capability and support for WMD activities. The last objective is reducing, destroying, or securing WMD when there is an agreement to do so.

DoD uses three strategic enablers to combat WMD. Strategic enablers are capabilities that help in executing the military strategy. Those enablers are intelligence, partnership capacity, and strategic communication support. Intelligence supports strategy, planning, and decision making; helps to improve operational capabilities; and informs programming and risk managers. Building partnership capacity enhances the DoD capability to combat WMD. Strategic communication support helps shape global, regional, and national perceptions. A USD(P) official stated that USSTRATCOM staff will complete the concept of operations plan using the National Military Strategy for Combating WMD.

Concept of Operations Plan. DoD did not have an up-to-date concept of operations plan for combating WMD. Although the Joint Staff began drafting one in 2000, it did not complete the plan. In the summer of 2005, responsibility for completing the concept of operations plan transferred to USSTRATCOM. In response to the draft of this report, USSTRATCOM officials stated that the Command expects to issue the concept of operations plan in the fall of 2006. Combatant commands will use the plan to integrate the pillars (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management) of the National Strategy for Combating WMD into their area-specific plans.

Annual Performance Planning and Reporting. In addition to strategic plans, GPRA requires that agencies prepare performance plans. The ATSD(NCB) issues two annual reports related to combating WMD—the CPRC Report and the Report on Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense. For 2004, the Report on Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense included the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program Performance Plan, which states that its intent was to comply with GPRA performance reporting requirements. However, neither the CPRC Report nor the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defense Program Performance Plan contains an overall assessment of Federal or DoD efforts to combat WMD, which is a GPRA reporting requirement.

Report on Counterproliferation. By May 1 of each year, 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress on the findings of the CPRC and the status of prior years' recommendations. In addition, 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) requires that the annual report comply with the annual performance planning and reporting requirements included in GPRA.

Report on Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense. Section 1523, title 50, United States Code requires that the Secretary of Defense submit an annual report

to Congress on the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The report⁴ must provide an assessment of the overall readiness of the armed forces to fight in a chemical or biological warfare environment as well as describe the steps taken or planned for improving readiness.

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report. Although the 2004 CPRC report to Congress was an improvement over the 2003 report, it did not provide an adequate assessment of the effectiveness of CPRC recommendations, as 22 U.S.C. 2751 (note) and GPRA require. Specifically, the 2004 report did not include performance goals and measures for using FY 2005 funds or provide an assessment on the use of FY 2003 funds. In addition, the FY 2004 CPRC report focused on accomplishments of member agencies—DoD, the Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency—and excluded other Federal agencies involved with WMD.

Assessing Performance. The 2004 CPRC report did not fully assess planned performance versus actual performance. The report provides information on 154 programs for combating WMD, including information on accomplishments, goals, and budgets for each program. However, the report did not provide sufficient information for DoD, the Department of Energy, or Congress to use in evaluating the effectiveness of combating WMD.

The 2004 CPRC report did not indicate whether agencies completed established milestones on time or within budget. In addition, many milestones were not quantified. For example, a milestone for training troops in combating WMD did not indicate the number of personnel that needed training or the time frames for completing training. The corresponding accomplishment for that milestone stated that 22,000 troops completed training in combating WMD. As another example, an accomplishment in the report for producing the Afghanistan Order of Battle stated that 1,100 copies of the book were produced. The corresponding milestones, however, were not quantified. Therefore, managers could not use the 2004 report for assessing the effectiveness of accomplishing the milestones.

Additionally, the programs in the 2004 CPRC report did not clearly correspond with the programs budgeted for \$917 million in the 2003 report. For example, 17 DTRA programs and 1 Navy program in the 2003 report were moved from their tables to various appendices in the 2004 CPRC report without an explanation. Also, the 2003 report combined several programs with other programs; for example, in the 2004 report the Patriot Recap Procurement, the Patriot Recap Procurement Initial Spares, and the Patriot Advanced Capability – 3 Electromagnetic Intrusion Detector programs in the 2003 CPRC report were all combined into the Patriot PAC-3 program. Because it does not describe the programs in both reports consistently, the report does not clearly show whether DoD Components completed those programs or how DoD spent the funds. Therefore, managers within DoD, the Department of Energy, the Intelligence community, and Congress could not use the report to evaluate the \$917.1 million budget. The 31 programs in the 2003 report that do not clearly correspond to the programs in the 2004 report are discussed in Appendix C.

⁴ The 2004 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program Annual Report to Congress included a performance plan for FY 03-05, which stated that it demonstrates compliance with GPRA.

Reporting Accomplishments. The 2004 CPRC report focused on accomplishments of member agencies, although other Federal agencies were involved with combating WMD. For example, although the Department of Homeland Security is not a member of the CPRC, the 2004 CPRC report included information about that agency's Chemical and Biological National Security Program but did not discuss goals or performance related to that program.

The CPRC report also did not include any information on several of the nonproliferation programs and activities that the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in the Department of State manages. Those programs and activities include initiatives for employing scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and treaty negotiations. ATSD(NCB) officials acknowledged the shortcomings in the CPRC reports and expressed a desire to make future reports better management tools. However, those officials stated that it was unclear whether Congress used the report because they did not receive congressional feedback.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program Performance Plan. The "Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program Performance Plan FY 2004 to FY 2006," March 2005, provides information on planning and reporting. The performance plan, which ATSD(NCB) publishes, shows actual performance of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense programs for FY 2004 and the goals of those programs for FY 2005 and FY 2006.

Although the performance plan states in the document that it "demonstrates compliance" with GPRA, it did not include financial information about the FY 2004 goals or the agency's performance. The performance plan also did not explain why DoD Components did not meet their goals or provide a plan of action or a schedule for achieving the goals as GPRA requires.

One of the major sections in the performance plan discusses advanced development and procurement. That section reported that, of 15 procurement goals for FY 2004, DoD Components did not meet 9. In addition, DoD Components did not meet at least 34 of 105 research and development⁵ goals. For example, although the DoD goal was to purchase 588 Joint Chemical Agent Detectors in FY 2004, DoD did not purchase any. Further, 15 of 30 procurement programs listed in the performance plan did not have performance goals for FY 2004. As a result, DoD officials could not evaluate how well program managers implemented procurement programs. In addition to not providing financial information related to the purchase of Joint Chemical Agent Detectors, the performance plan did not explain the shortfall in the number of purchased items. DoD managers and Congress could better evaluate the status of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program if ATSD(NCB) managers included financial information and explained why goals in the performance plan were not met.

~~(FOUO)~~

⁵ We could not evaluate the achievement of all goals because the performance plan did not always describe performance.



Establishing Responsibility

Although DoD improved its efforts to combat WMD, DoD directives did not establish a single Component within the offices of USD(P), USD(AT&L), or Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsible for combating WMD. Clearly defined authorities and expressly delineated responsibilities within those offices would improve management controls for combating WMD.

Management Control Requirements. Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, "Management Accountability and Control," June 21, 1995, provides guidance to Federal managers for improving accountability and effectiveness of Federal programs and operations. The circular states that management controls must be consistent with the criteria in "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government," which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued in November 1999.

The "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government" provides the framework for establishing and maintaining internal control within the Federal Government. It states that a good internal control environment requires that an agency's organizational structure must clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility as well as establish appropriate lines of reporting.

Organization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Within the Office of USD(P), 12 offices were responsible for combating WMD. None of them, however, had overall responsibility for coordinating the efforts to combat WMD. Each office reported to the USD(P) through three assistant secretaries—the Assistant Secretaries for International Security Policy, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and Homeland Defense.

Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction Authorities. The definition of WMD was not standard within DoD or the Federal Government. Officials from USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health and Protection, and DTRA each stated that a standard definition of WMD would assist their respective Components in defining their mission for combating WMD. The sources that do define WMD include Public Law 104-201, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms (see Appendix D for the various definitions for weapons of mass destruction).

According to DoD officials, the definition of WMD affects how their offices plan their mission. If DoD used the WMD definition included in the National Strategy, DoD would not include high explosives, radiological matters, or WMD delivery in its mission. USSTRATCOM officials commented that if they included delivery in the definition of WMD, automobiles would be included. Clearly defining WMD would aid DoD officials in defining their WMD mission.

Management Action Taken to Define WMD. DoD defined WMD in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD. That strategy defines WMD as:

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in a manner so as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude means of delivery of weapons where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.


Offices That are Responsible for Combating WMD. The Process Action Team that reviewed WMD for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified 12 key offices within USD(P) for combating WMD.

The figure on page 14 demonstrates the reporting chain for each key office to elevate WMD information to higher authority levels within USD(P). No single office was responsible for coordinating, consolidating, and reporting WMD information. The USD(AT&L) and the Joint Staff were each organized with no single office accountable for coordinating, consolidating, and reporting WMD information.

Management Actions to Improve the Organizational Structure. In January 2005, DoD officials began to improve the organizational structure for combating WMD when the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, USSTRATCOM as the military lead. In that role, the USSTRATCOM mission was to plan, integrate, and synchronize DoD efforts to combat WMD and, when directed, execute them in direct support of combatant commands. In August 2005, responsibilities for counterproliferation policy and cooperative threat reduction were assigned to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy. That office already was responsible for interdiction and related non-proliferation activities.

~~(FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Key Offices Within USD(P) Responsible for Combating WMD

Spending and Performance

Improving existing coordination for combating WMD would help DoD effectively spend \$9.9 billion budgeted for FY 2006 through FY 2011. Coordinating WMD initiatives should also provide greater assurance that DoD can adequately protect U.S. interests and properly respond to a WMD attack.

Improving existing coordination for combating WMD would help DoD effectively spend combating WMD funds. Coordinating the efforts would provide DoD managers needed information on how they can best use resources. For example, if the U.S. Government had success with preventing the proliferation of WMD, DoD could request fewer funds for counterproliferation.

Senator Richard Lugar conducted a survey of WMD experts and national security experts who highlighted the importance of an effective WMD program. The "Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses," June 2005, estimates a 70 percent chance of a WMD attack somewhere in the world within the next 10 years. As such, decision makers within DoD and Congress must have up-to-date information on WMD to help them determine whether the program is effective and funds are appropriately spent. The status of those initiatives should include descriptions of any threat to U.S. interests, existing capabilities and those needed for combating WMD, and the state of troop training and readiness. If an attack involving WMD were to occur within the United States or in an area of U.S. interest, then DoD, other Federal entities, and allies should be able to respond effectively.

Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

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Audit Response. Based on management comments, we updated the finding. Our responses to those comments are presented below. DoD actions undertaken to make organizational changes for improving its ability to combat WMD are commendable. These actions will improve DoD efforts to manage funds used to combat weapons of mass destruction, to protect U.S. interests, and to properly respond to an attack when others use weapons of mass destruction. Although we updated the report to consider those actions, the changes do not impact the validity of the finding.

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(FOUO) [REDACTED]

(FOUO)

Audit Response to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments. Although the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not believe there was a material management control weakness, the "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government" states that a good internal control environment requires the organizational structure to clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility as well as establish appropriate lines of reporting; that management compare major agency achievements to plans, goals, and objectives established under GPRA; and that managers compare actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization.

Based on the Principal Deputy's statement that the draft report was inaccurate, we updated the final report to provide more current information. For the final report, we added release of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, consolidation of USD(P) offices, and approval of the charter for the Combating WMD Coordination Group as management actions taken.

Audit Response to the Deputy Chief, Policy, Doctrine, and International Affairs, U.S. Strategic Command Comments. Based on the Deputy Chief's comments, we updated the report to show as management actions taken:

- DoD is updating DoD Directive 2060.2.
- DoD renamed the Combating WMD Action Group as the Combating WMD Coordination Group.
- DoD released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
- DoD approved the "National Military Strategy to Combat WMD."
- The Secretary of Defense appointed USSTRATCOM as the military lead for integrating and synchronizing DoD in combating WMD.
- DoD standardized the definition of WMD in the "National Military Strategy to Combat WMD."

Based on the Deputy Chief's comments, we also included the nine specific end states, four military strategic objectives, three strategic enablers for combating WMD, and clarified the responsibilities that the Secretary of Defense delegated to the Commander, USSTRATCOM.

The ATSD(NCB); the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Deputy Chief, Policy, Doctrine and International Affairs provided additional comments on the draft report. We discuss those comments in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response section of this report.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

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1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

a. Designate a primary office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to coordinate responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction.

b. Update Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy directives to reflect responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction.

Management Comments. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided comments for USD(P). The Principal Secretary stated that he consolidated organizations for combating WMD under the Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy on April 3, 2006. Draft DoD Directive 2060.2, "Department of Defense (DoD) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy," designates that office as the single point of contact within the USD(P).

Audit Response. The Principal Deputy's comments along with actions to update DoD Directive 2060.2 were responsive to the recommendation and no further comments are required.

2. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

a. Designate a primary office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to coordinate responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction.

Management Comments. The ATSD(NCB) provided comments on behalf of the USD(AT&L) and he concurred with the recommendation.

b. Update Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directives to reflect responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction.

Management Comments. The ATSD(NCB) concurred with the recommendation.

c. Propose legislation that includes the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency as part of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee.

d. Include the status of outstanding recommendations from previous years, including the status of 31 budgeted programs shown in the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report for 2003 to ensure consistent reporting from year-to-year.

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Audit Response. The actions that the ATSD(NCB) proposed satisfy the intent of the recommendation.

3. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Logistics; and the Director, Joint Staff develop an annual performance plan and annual

performance report that consolidates all DoD initiatives for combating weapons of mass destruction.

4. We recommend that the Director, Administration and Management designate combating weapons of mass destruction as an assessable unit and assess management controls over the initiative.

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Audit Response. DoD Instruction 5010.40 implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for DoD management control programs. It states that DoD Components should be segmented into organizational assessable units. DoD Directive 5010.38 states that the Under Secretaries of Defense and Assistant Secretaries of Defense are to identify management control weaknesses in their functional areas that should be reported. Program, operational, and administrative internal controls should be assessed.

Combating WMD is 1 of 10 capability portfolios listed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that DoD wants to improve. Also, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priority areas in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Because combating WMD is critical to the DoD mission, and USD(P) and USD(AT&L) are responsible for identifying management control weaknesses within their functional areas, those offices should evaluate the controls over the combating WMD mission. Evaluating the controls would start with those offices designating combating WMD as an assessable unit within their offices.

5. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command:

a. Complete the concept of operations plan for combating weapons of mass destruction.

b. Designate combating weapons of mass destruction as an assessable unit and assess management controls over that unit.

Management Comments. The Deputy Chief, Policy, Doctrine and International Affairs, USSTRATCOM concurred.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We reviewed DoD methods and policies for managing prevention of WMD proliferation. The review included the National Security Presidential Directive No. 17; National Strategies, Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2001; CPRC annual reports for FY 2003 and FY 2004; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Defense Plan annual reports; and DoD Directives. We also reviewed the meeting minutes of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and briefing slides on the USSTRATCOM Combating WMD Center and Quadrennial Defense Review for 2001. The documentation reviewed is dated from January 1993 through February 2006.

We conducted interviews with officials from the Office of the USD(P), the Office of the USD(AT&L), the Office of the USD(Personnel and Readiness), the Office of the USD(Comptroller), the Office of Policy Analysis and Evaluation, DTRA, the Joint Staff, and the USSTRATCOM.

At USSTRATCOM we interviewed officials and reviewed USSTRATCOM plans for fulfilling the role of military lead for combating WMD. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM plan for organizing its efforts by setting up a center for combating WMD and reviewed draft implementation documents.

We performed this audit from October 2004 through January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We assessed DoD organizational arrangements for combating WMD. Specifically, we reviewed the roles and responsibilities of DoD Components in combating WMD and evaluated the economy and efficiency of those roles and responsibilities.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area. GAO has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the DoD Approach to Business Transformation high-risk area.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, GAO issued two reports that discuss combating WMD. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

GAO

GAO Report No. GAO-05-157, "Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration," January 2005

GAO Report No. GAO-04-330, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses
Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved,"
February 2004

Appendix B. Responsibilities of Components Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

According to information provided by the USD(P), 40 offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff had responsibilities for combating WMD. The U.S. Strategic Command also has responsibilities for combating WMD. DoD discusses responsibilities for combating WMD in various directives. DoD Directive 2060.2 assigns overall responsibilities for WMD counterproliferation to principal staff assistants, including USD(P), USD(AT&L), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to those principal staff assistants, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has combating WMD responsibilities. DoD organizational directives provide added guidance on the WMD responsibilities of offices and Components.

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DoD Directive 2060.2 states that USD(P) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of counterproliferation policy throughout DoD. In addition, DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy (USD[P]),” December 8, 1999, and DoD Directive 5111.14, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD[ISP]),” March 22, 2005, provide USD(P) Components’ responsibilities for combating WMD. Directives for many of those offices follow.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. DoD Directive 5111.1 states that USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for formulating national security and defense policy. Additionally, USD(P):

- develops policy for defense-related international negotiations;
- develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of DoD policies to reduce and counter the threat of WMD, including counterproliferation policy, arms control policy, and security policy; and
- coordinates with USD(AT&L) on all nuclear, chemical, and biological issues.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). DoD Directive 5111.14 states that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for arms control, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) develops DoD policy for:

- nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced weapons and missiles;
- arms control negotiations, implementation, and verification related to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapon systems; and
- cooperative threat reduction with the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy carries out those responsibilities through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation.

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nonproliferation. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy focuses on nonproliferation initiatives, such as multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements that deal with combating WMD, counterproliferation, and arms reduction. The Nonproliferation Policy division of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy has three branches—the Interdiction Export Control Branch, the Chemical and Biological Treaty Branch, and the Nuclear Treaty Branch. The Interdiction Export Control Branch focuses on cutting off the supply of information to proliferators of WMD. The Chemical and Biological Treaty Branch works closely with the intelligence

community to prevent the proliferation of exports to nations of concern. The Nuclear Treaty Branch monitors treaties with other nations.

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation manages WMD counterproliferation with other countries and represents DoD counterproliferation policy interests in interagency forums. It also develops policy for consequence management, passive defense, and WMD elimination.*

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. As of August 2005, the organization directive for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict had not been issued. According to officials, the office focuses on interdiction as well as hard and deeply buried targets. Additionally, the office oversees special operations and reviews policies for overseas consequence management.

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DoD Directive 2060.2 states that the USD(AT&L) coordinates DoD research, development, and acquisition programs to support counterproliferation efforts. DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])," December 9, 2005, and DoD Directive 5134.8, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD[NCB])," June 8, 1994, provide combating WMD responsibilities for USD(AT&L) Components. In addition, DoD Directive 5105.62, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency," November 28, 2005, provides responsibilities for that agency, which reports to USD(AT&L).

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. DoD Directive 5134.01 states that the USD(AT&L) is the principal

* Policies for consequence management include measures to restore essential Government services affected by the consequences of a WMD event. Policies for passive defense include measures to reduce the vulnerabilities and minimize the effect of WMD. Policies for WMD elimination include measures that will support seizure, removal, disablement, or destruction of capabilities to research, develop, test, produce, store, deploy, or employ WMD.

staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. The directive also states that the USD(AT&L) exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director of DTRA.

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. DoD Directive 5134.8 states that ATSD(NCB) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) for all matters concerning the formulation of policy and plans for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Specifically, ATSD(NCB):

- develops policies, provides advice, and makes recommendations to the USD(AT&L);
- issues guidance for chemical and biological defense, safety, and security of the current chemical weapons stockpile, and chemical and biological arms control activities;
- promotes coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding on counterproliferation policies within DoD and between DoD and other Federal agencies; and
- reports directly to the Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological defense programs.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DoD Directive 5105.62 states that the mission of DTRA is safeguarding the United States and its allies from WMD by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects. DTRA performs its mission by:

- supporting integration of combating WMD activities and tasks in DoD;
- supporting the Commander, USSTRATCOM;
- supporting DoD nonproliferation tasks and activities;
- supporting DoD counterproliferation tasks and related activities to interdict, deter, and defend against the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear explosives;
- supporting DoD consequence management tasks and related activities; and
- managing the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program.

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DoD Directive 2060.2 states that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares plans for addressing proliferation threats, reviews plans that combatant commanders prepare, and develops doctrine for joint counterproliferation.

U.S. Strategic Command. The Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum in January 2005 appointing the Commander, USSTRATCOM as the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing capabilities for combating WMD. According to Joint Staff officials, USSTRATCOM was chosen because the command already focused on elimination and interdiction of WMD.

As the lead combatant command for combating WMD, USSTRATCOM plans, integrates, and synchronizes DoD efforts to combat WMD, and when directed, executes in direct support of combatant commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is an advocate for future capabilities to dissuade, deter, and prevent the acquisition, development, transfer, or use of WMD, its delivery systems, and associated technology and materials.

Appendix C. Schedule of 2003 Programs not Clearly Tracked to the 2004 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report

Thirty-one programs, shown as budgeted for \$917.1 million, in the CPRC report for 2003, could not be clearly followed to the CPRC report for 2004. Managers and Congress could not use the report to determine whether those programs were complete or exactly what was accomplished with the funds. Those programs are shown in the following table.

2003 Programs Not Clearly Tracked to the 2004 CPRC Report		
Number	Program Title	FY 2004 Budget (Millions)
1	Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter	\$ 1.0
2	Joint Staff Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector	18.8
3	Joint Staff Family of Decontamination Systems	29.7
4	Protective Clothing	79.1
5	Medical Biological Weapons Defense: Vaccine Procurement Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program	63.1
6	Modular Decontamination System	5.0
7	Joint Warning and Reporting Network	28.3
8	Sorbent Decontamination System	0.3
9	Critical Reagents Program	5.0
10	Joint Biological Point Detection System	152.0
11	Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System	9.8
12	Collectively Protected Amphibious Backfit	14.7
13	Joint Collective Protection Equipment	4.9
14	Joint Biological Standoff Detection System	16.3
15	Guard and Reserve Equipment	7.9

**2003 Programs Not Clearly Tracked to the 2004 CPRC Report
(cont'd)**

Number	Program Title	FY 2004 Budget (Millions)
16	United Nations Operations in Iraq	\$ 1.0
17	Digital Medical Architecture	2.2
18	Patriot (Recap) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation	28.9
19	Patriot Recap Procurement	36.2
20	Patriot Recap Procurement Initial Spares	13.6
21	Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 Electromagnetic Intrusion Detector	177.4
22	Tactical Missile System Program	2.4
23	Advanced Medical Countermeasures Program	45.0
24	Medical Radiological Defense - Concept Exploration	5.0
25	Joint Physical Security Equipment	31.7
26	Classified Program No. 1	9.3
27	Classified Program No. 2	4.6
28	Classified Program No. 3	23.3
29	Classified Program No. 4	25.0
30	Classified Program No. 5	51.7
31	Classified Program No. 6	23.9
	Total	\$ 917.1

Source: 2003 CPRC Report Volume III

Appendix D. Definitions for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Publications defining WMD are Public Law 104-201, section 1403, "The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," and the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

Public Law 104-201. Public Law 104-201, section 1403, defines WMD as any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people. WMD weapons or devices can cause death or injury through release, dissemination, or effects of toxic or poisonous chemicals; a disease organism; or radiation.

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The National Strategy defines WMD as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. DoD Components are using this directive as guidance for combating WMD until DoD issues its plans and guidance.

DoD Dictionary of Military Terms. The Dictionary of Military Terms defines WMD as weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. The dictionary states that WMD can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. The definition does not, however, include information on how the weapon is transported or propelled when it is a separate and divisible part of the weapon.

Appendix E. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Director, Administration and Management

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Combatant Command

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Other Defense Organization

Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Office of Management and Budget

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member (cont'd)

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) Comments



ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

MAY 22 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR PROGRAM DIRECTOR, READINESS AND
OPERATIONS SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE

THROUGH: DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION RESOURCES AND ANALYSIS *78 5/26/06*

SUBJECT: DoDIG Action – Report on DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction (Project No. D2005-DOOOLG-0050.000)

On behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, the attached response to the subject DoD Office of the
Inspector General (DoD OIG) report is provided. The project officers in this
matter are [REDACTED] 703-767-[REDACTED], [REDACTED]@dtra.mil, and Mr. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 703-767-[REDACTED], [REDACTED]@dtra.mil.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Dale Klein".

Dale Klein

Attachment
As stated

Final Report
Reference

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
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
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
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Final Report
Reference

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


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
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
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Final Report
Reference

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
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


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


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
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Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

Final Report
Reference



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Project Number D2005-D000LG-0050.000

MAY 25 2005

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on your draft report DoD Initiatives for Combating WMD. We reviewed this report and do not agree with its finding that a material management control weakness exists.

The draft report does not take into account the steps DoD has taken to address the combating WMD mission. These steps were taken in the course of, and as part of, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its implementation. The draft report contains inaccurate and dated information, and relies too heavily on the 2003 and 2004 annual Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) Reports to Congress. Therefore, I non-concur with the report as written and I recommend that your staff update the report prior to public distribution.

The QDR is one key way that DoD conducts a self-assessment every four years. This year, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD was identified as one of four capability areas of priority focus for the QDR. This was the first time that the QDR devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. As part of the 2006 QDR, the Department determined the definition of the mission, the roles, and the organizations required to meet the needed capabilities for this priority area, known as "Combating WMD."

The definition of the Department's combating WMD mission was approved during the QDR deliberations. This approval led to the February 2006 promulgation of the document that defines the mission for DoD – the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD. The roles of Department organizations in fulfilling the combating WMD mission were also approved as part of the QDR process. A DoD Directive, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy 2060.2, which is now in final staffing, codifies these roles. As part of the QDR process, all DoD components were directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission.



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Page 2

In August of 2005, even before the 2006 QDR was promulgated, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy - already responsible for interdiction and related WMD non-proliferation activities - was assigned additional responsibilities for the combating WMD mission. In particular, the Offices of Counterproliferation Policy and Cooperative Threat Reduction were moved into his portfolio. On April 3, 2006, I formalized the policy functions consolidation effort by directing the further consolidation of combating WMD activities under the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy.

In addition to the QDR-specific actions, the Department established a Combating WMD Coordination Group (CCG), whose mission is to promote transparency and improve cooperation among the DoD elements across the full spectrum of combating WMD activities. Co-chaired by an Executive Council at the 2-Star level, the CCG charter was approved on January 13, 2006. This group also meets at the staff level twice a month to share information about on-going activities. This group will be able to track progress of the Department in meeting its goals in combating WMD.

Please let me know if we can provide further information. My point of contact for this issue is [REDACTED] 703-614 [REDACTED]

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U.S. Strategic Command Comments



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

May 18, 2006

Reply To:
USSTRATCOM/J51
901 SAC BLVD STE 2F24
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6500

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING

Attention: Program Director, Readiness and Operations Support

Subject: Report on DoD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Project No. D2005-D000LG-0050.000)

References:

- a. Reference your memorandum, 3 April 2006, same subject.
- b. Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, revised 21 June 1995.
2. USSTRATCOM has reviewed reference (a) and submits the following for your consideration:
 - a. Regarding USSTRATCOM designating combating WMD as an assessable unit, this will be done under reference (b). We will continue to monitor and report progress as required.
 - b. Regarding USSTRATCOM expediting completion of the concept plan for combating WMD, this is being done per the Secretary of Defense's approved timeline and will be completed by the fall of this year.
 - c. Other comments as included in the attachment.
3. My POC is Mr. [REDACTED] International, Nuclear Deterrence, Combating WMD and Global Strike Policy Branch, DSN 272- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
DAF


Deputy Chief, Policy, Doctrine and International Affairs

Attachment: As stated.

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



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Team Members

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Readiness and Operations Support prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

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Inspector General
Department of Defense

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